Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington: Economics of Regulation and AntitrustFrom WikiSummary, the Free Social Science Summary Database This summary needs formatting (i.e. "wikification"). Can you help us improve it? (Formatting help.) Please volunteer.
Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington. 2000. Economics of Regulation and Antitrust. Cambridge: MIT Press, 3d edition, pages 297-336. Discusses the three historical approaches to studying regulation of the economy:
The authors point out that neither of these two early approaches was really a theory; neither explained when regulation will occur, or how. Thus were just empirical observations (and not very good ones). See also Noll about these first two.
Main point about NPT: regulation doesn't always respond to market failures, and regulation isn't always appropriate from a social welfare perspective (it creates net costs for society). Main point about CT: Why do we have regulations that do resolve market failures? Why are some regulations actually public-spirited? Olson still matters. It matters whether you are a big or small player. Big firms will lobby for more protection. Empirical test: Viscusi summarizes one study that is a nice test of all the theories: bank deregulation. States deregulated banks at different times. So Y = the timing (over a 20-30 year span) of state deregulation. A proxy for the capture idea: Large banks favor deregulation, small banks oppose it. Also, small firms favor deregulation (so that they can get credit cheaper). So the authors look at the share of small firms and small banks in each state.
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