Riker and Ordeshook: A theory of the calculus of votingFrom WikiSummary, the Free Social Science Summary Database For discussion of the most recent research visit our sister site, AbstractPolitics.com!
Understanding
Understanding
Riker and Ordeshook. 1970. A theory of the calculus of voting. American Political Science Review 1970:25-41.
[edit] In Brief: The Paradox of No TurnoutThe authors begin where Downs (1957) left off: Rational choice appears to predict unrealistically low levels of turnout. They express this in equation 1, where R = the reward in utils of voting; B = the benefits of having your candidate win (compared to benefits of opponent); P = probability that your vote matters; and C = costs of voting: Equation (1): R = (B*P) - C In a population with 100 million voters, Downs assumed P would always be 1/100,000,000. Thus, any positive C would make R negative. The surprising result: Nobody will ever vote. Rather than ask why so many people don't vote, then, rational choice leads us to ask why so many people do. The authors suggest a couple possible solutions to this paradox, although the "paradox of non-voting" has been the subjected of repeated scholarly inquiry. For more, see turnout. [edit] Main Arguments[edit] Reinventing the D TermThe authors insert D into the equation. D represents your sense of civic duty, your satisfaction from voting, your desire to affirm your partisanship or efficacy, etc (see pg 28). Thus, we get a new equation, in which C and D become the most important figures (since B*P is effectively zero, at least so far): Equation (7): R = B*P - C + D Downs had also proposed a D term, although his D represented a voter's desire to support democracy as a system. For Downs, a voter might turn out merely to prevent the democratic collapse that would follow zero turnout. (Note that this argument collapses on itself; just as no vote has much chance of deciding the election result, no vote has much chance of deciding the fate of democracy.) [edit] P Can MatterP can be much larger than Downs suggested. As the race gets closer to a tie, voters perceive that their vote has a much higher probability of affecting the outcome. Moreover, we tend to overestimate P (for more on the latter point, see Quattrone and Tversky 1988). Thus: Equation (21): P = a bunch of calculus. The point: as your candidate's vote share approaches 50%, P increases. [edit] Data and TestingThe authors test their ideas using survey data from 1952, 1956, and 1960, showing that P, B, C, and D (at the individual level) could predict Y, the probability that a particular respondent (claims that he) voted.
[edit] FindingsSee Table 3 (p 38). The main hypotheses are validated. [edit] Comments and CriticismNote that a model driven by D and C doesn't explain why voters are strategic. ("Strategic voting" means that voters consider not only a candidate's positions, but also whether he is electable--thus, as an example, voters abandon the Green (or Libertarian) Party and vote for the Democrats (or Republicans) instead.) Strategic behavior implies that B (and therefore P) must matter. An arcane and technical point that later critics have made: This analysis shows only that P, B, C, and D have marginal effects on Y (the probability of turnout). That is, it shows that increasing B, P, or D (or decreasing C) can change the probability of turnout, but it does not show that there is a particular (observed) combination of P, B, C, and D that will consistently lead us to predict that a particular voter will turn out.
Related Reading The following summaries link (or linked) to this one: Keywords: Authors/Riker, William - Authors/Ordeshook, Peter - Political Science - American Politics - Voting - Downsian Model |
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