Chandler: Federalism and political parties. In Federalism and the Role of the State, Herman Bakvis and Willia
From WikiSummary, the Free Social Science Summary Database
Chandler. 1987. Federalism and political parties. In Federalism and the Role of the State, Herman Bakvis and Willia. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Key question: How do "variations in regionalism or territorial politics impinge on the role of political parties within federal systems and how [do] political parties in turn shape the forces of regionalism"?
Key argument: Federalism based on a jurisdictional division of labor leads to party bifurcation between the federal and provincial level. A functional division of labor encourages party integration between levels.
Key conclusion: Parties can serve an integrating function only if the federal structure is functional. Jurisdictional federalism leads to bifurcation.
Jurisdictional vs Functional Divisions
A "jurisdictional" division of labor has two autonomous levels of government (the usual form of federalism):
- incentives are greater for each level to go it alone
- incentives are greater for regional elites to politicize federal-region relations
- encourages party bifurcation between the federal and provincial level (e.g. Canada, US)
- marginalizes regional parties from policy process
A "functional" division of labor (federal government sets policy; regional governments implement it) is a different form of federalism, mostly seen only in Germany, but also in Belgium:
- creates a need for bargaining and cooperation between levels of government
- encourages party integration between levels (e.g. Germany)
- parties remain central to the policy process