Category:Summaries Needing Wikification
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Summaries tagged with keyword "Summaries Needing Wikification"
There are 152 articles with this keyword.
B
- Bawn: Political control versus expertise
- Becker: A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence
- Bendor and Hammond: Rethinking Allison's models
- Bermeo: Ordinary people in extraordinary times
- Berry and Berry: State lottery adoptions as policy innovations
- Bowler and Donovan: Measuring the effect of direct democracy on state policy
- Brace, Sims-Butler, Arceneaux, and Johnson: Public opinion in the American states
- Bratton and Van de Walle: Democratic experiments in Africa
- Brown: Party cleavages and welfare effort in the American states
- Brubaker and Laitin: Ethnic and nationalist violence
- Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith: An institutional explanation of the democratic peace
- Burns, Evans, Gamm, and McConnaughy: Pockets of expertise in American state legislatures
C
- Carey, Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell: Term limits in the state legislatures
- Carpenter: State building through reputation building
- Cederman: Emergent actors in world politics
- Cheng and Haggard: Democracy and deficits in Taiwan
- Coase: The lighthouse in economics
- Coase: The problem of social cost
- Collier: Paths toward democracy
- Copeland: The origins of major war
- Cowhey: Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitments
- Cox, Kousser, and McCubbins: What polarizes parties
- Crisp, Moreno, and Shugart: The accountability deficit in Latin America
- Crosier: John Snow
D
- De Figueiredo, Spiller, and Urbiztondo: An informational perspective on adminsitrative procedures
- Demsetz: Toward a theory of property rights
- Dickson and Scheve: Social identity, political speech, and electoral competition
- Doyle: Empires
- Doyle: Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs
- Drazen: Political economy in macroeconomics
E
- Eaton: Can politicians control bureaucrats
- Edelman: Social movements
- Epstein and O'Halloran: Administrative procedures, information, and agency discretion
- Evans and Rauch: Bureaucracy and growth
F
- Ferejohn and Shipan: Congressional influence on administrative agencies
- Finnemore and Sikkink: International norm dynamics and political change
- Finnemore: Constructing norms of humanitarian intervention
- Frieden: Actors and preferences in international relations
G
- Garrett: Global markets and national politics
- Geddes: What do we know about democratization after 20 years
- Gimpelson and Treisman: Fiscal games and public employment
- Golden: Electoral connections
- Gourevitch: The governance problem in international relations
- Gourevitch: The international system and regime formation
- Green and Gerber: Reclaiming the experimental tradition in political science
- Greif: Cultural beliefs and the organization of society
- Greif: Self-enforcing political systems and economic growth
- Gurr: Peoples versus States
- Gurr: Why men rebel
H
- Haas: What is nationalism and why should we study it
- Haggard and Kaufman: The political economy of democratic transitions
- Haggard and Noble: Power politics
- Hardin: Efficiency
- Hart: Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm
- Hechter and Okamoto: Political consequences of minority group formation
- Hero and Tolbert: A racial/ethnic diversity interpretation of politics and policy in the states of the US
- Hibbs: Political parties and macroeconomic policy
- Hogan: The costs of representation in state legislatures
- Holmes: Precommitment and the paradox of democracy
- Hont: The permanent crisis of a divided mankind
- Horowitz: Ethnic groups in conflict
- Huber and Shipan: Deliberate discretion
- Hug and Sciarini: Referendums on European integration
- Huntington: The Clash of Civilizations
J
- Jackson: Quasi-states, dual regimes, and neoclassical theory
- Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein: Norms, identity, and culture in national security
- Jervis: Cooperation under the security dilemma
K
- Kahler: Rationality in international relations
- Kato: Politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups in Japan
- Katzenstein and et al: The role of theory in comparative politics
- Kaufmann, Gimpel, and Hoffman: A promise fulfilled
- Kaviraj and Khilnani: Civil society
- Kavka: Hobbesian moral and political theory
- Keck and Sikkink: Activists beyond borders
- Keefer: Clientelism, Credibility, and Democracy
- Keohane: After hegemony
- Kiewiet and McCubbins: Presidential influence on Congressional appropriations decisions
- Kim: Partisan deadlocks and agenda-setting in American state legislatures
- Klein: Fisher-General Motors and the nature of the firm
- Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal: The rational design of international institutions
- Korpi and Palme: New politics and class politics in the context of austerity and globalization
- Krasner: Approaches to the state
- Krasner: Compromising Westphalia
- Krueger: The political economy of rent-seeking
L
- La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Pop Eleches, and Shleifer: Judicial Checks and Balances
- Lake and Rothchild: Territorial decentralization and civil war settlements
- Lake: Anarchy, hierarchy, and the variety of international relations
- Lake: Hierarchy in International Relations
- Legro: Military culture and inadvertent escalation in World War II
- Levy: Prospect theory, rational choice, and international relations
- Lewis: Convention
- Libecap: Economic variables and the development of the law
M
- Magagna: Communities of grain
- Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes: Elections and representation
- Marshall: Turnout and representation
- Martin and Simmons: Theories and empirical studies of international institutions
- Martin: Democratic commitments
- McCubbins and Noble: Perceptions and realities of Japanese budgeting
- McCubbins and Thies: As a matter of factions
- McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast: Structure and process, politics and policy
- Mendel: Experiments in plant hybridization
- Milner: Interests, institutions, and information
- Mintrom: Policy entrepreneurs and the diffusion of innovation
- Moe: Control and feedback in economic regulation
- Moe: Political institutions
- Moore: Social origins of dictatorship and democracy
- Moravcsik: The origins of human rights regimes
- Morrow: The strategic setting of choices
- Muller and Seligson: Inequality and insurgency
N
- Nacif: Understanding party discipline in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies
- Nardulli: Political subcultures in the American states
- Norris: Electoral engineering
O
P
- Popkin: Public choice and rural development
- Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi: What makes democracies endure
R
- Raustiala: States, NGOs, and international enviromental institutions
- Reus-Smit: The constitutional structure of international society and the nature of fundamental institutions
- Riker: Political science and rational choice
- Risse-Kappen: Collective identity in a democratic community
- Roberts: Political institutions, policy expectations, and the 1980 elections
- Rogowski: Institutions as constraints on strategic choice
- Rokkan: State formation, nation-building, and mass politics in Europe
- Root: Tying the King's hands
- Russett and Oneal: Triangulating peace
S
- Savage: Policy innovativeness as a trait of American states
- Shleifer and Vishny: Corruption
- Sinclair: Multiple paths
- Smith: Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics
- Snyder: Myths of empire
- Soskice: Divergent production regimes
- Stein: When misperception matters
- Strom: Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies
T
- Thies: Keeping tabs on partners
- Thompson, Cassie, and Jewell: A sacred cow or just a lot of bull
- Tiebout: A pure theory of local expenditures
- Treisman: Rational appeasement
- Treisman: The causes of corruption
- Tullock: The costs of special privilege
V
- Van Evera: Offense, defense, and the causes of war
- Varian: Intermediate microeconomics
- Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington: Economics of Regulation and Antitrust
W
- Walker: The diffusion of innovations among the American states
- Walter: The critical barrier to civil war settlement
- Waltz: Theory of international politics
- Walzer: The idea of civil society
- Wantchekon: Clientelism and voting behavior
- Weber: Methodology of the Social Sciences
- Wendt: Anarchy is what states make of it
- Williamson: The economics of organization
- Wright and Schaffner: The influence of party
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